

Original Research Article

Funding the Watchdog, Starving the Watch: Budget Planning and the Edwards III Implementation Gap at the Papuan People's Assembly Secretariat, South Papua

Melania Dewantri Ohoiwutun^{1*}, Kridawati Sadhana¹, Roos Widjajani¹¹Universitas Merdeka Malang

Article History

Received: 18.08.2026

Accepted: 21.10.2026

Published: 24.10.2026

Journal homepage:

<https://www.easpublisher.com>

Quick Response Code



Abstract: This study examines how budget-planning policy is implemented at the Secretariat of the Papuan People's Assembly (Majelis Rakyat Papua, MRP) in South Papua Province and how that planning supports the Assembly's oversight of the Papuan Special Autonomy Fund. Using George C. Edwards III's implementation model (communication, resources, disposition, and bureaucratic structure) as the analytical lens, the study adopted a qualitative descriptive case design drawing on in-depth interviews with five purposively selected informants, field observation, and analysis of the Secretariat's 2025 and 2026 Budget Implementation Documents (DPA). Planning was procedurally compliant, anchored in a layered regulatory hierarchy and executed through formal coordination forums. Substantively, however, the budget fell by about 48% between 2025 and 2026, the dedicated programme supporting the MRP's mandated tasks (Rp6.14 billion in 2025) disappeared from the 2026 DPA, personnel spending rose to 48.5% of the total, and logistics and protocol items expanded sharply. Rigid price standards, information-system constraints, late approvals, staff multitasking, and rented premises compounded these shifts. The findings reveal a decoupling between procedural compliance and oversight capacity, suggesting that Edwards III's variables should be read through the budget as revealed priority. Ring-fenced oversight lines and performance indicators are recommended.

Keywords: Policy Implementation, Budget Planning, Edwards III, Papuan People's Assembly, Special Autonomy Fund, South Papua.

Copyright © 2026 The Author(s): This is an open-access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution **4.0 International License (CC BY-NC 4.0)** which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium for non-commercial use provided the original author and source are credited.

1. INTRODUCTION

Asymmetric decentralisation has become one of the principal instruments through which the Indonesian state attempts to reconcile national unity with the distinct historical, cultural, and developmental claims of its eastern periphery. Papua is the clearest example. Law No. 21 of 2001 (2001) granted the region special autonomy, combining wider governmental authority with a dedicated fiscal transfer, the Special Autonomy Fund (Dana Otonomi Khusus, hereafter Otsus Fund), intended to accelerate development and protect the basic rights of Indigenous Papuans (Orang Asli Papua). The underlying fiscal logic follows the classic argument of fiscal federalism that public goods are best provided by the level of government closest to the preferences of the people they serve (Oates, 1999). Two decades of implementation, however, produced mixed results, and the central government revised the framework through Law No. 2 of 2021 (2021), which explicitly sought to

strengthen the governance, supervision, and accountability of Otsus spending.

The revision coincided with the creation of new provinces. Law No. 14 of 2022 (2022) established South Papua Province, comprising Merauke, Boven Digoel, Mappi, and Asmat regencies, with the stated aims of shortening the span of control and improving public services. Research on Indonesian territorial proliferation has long warned that new administrative units are created faster than their institutional capacity can be built, and that fiscal incentives embedded in the transfer system shape both the decision to split and the subsequent behaviour of new governments (Fitriani *et al.*, 2005). Newly formed provincial bodies in Papua therefore face a double task: they must construct basic administrative infrastructure while simultaneously delivering the special mandates attached to autonomy.

Among those mandates, the Papuan People's Assembly (MRP) occupies a unique position. Established under Law No. 21 of 2001 (2001) and operationalised by Government Regulation No. 54 of 2004 (2004), later amended by Government Regulation No. 64 of 2008 (2008), the MRP is the cultural representative body of Indigenous Papuans, composed of customary, religious, and women's representatives. Its functions include giving consideration and approval on specific policies, channelling the aspirations of Indigenous communities, and overseeing the implementation of special autonomy as it affects Indigenous rights. Yet the MRP is not a legislature: it has no budgetary power over the provincial budget and relies on a Secretariat, a regional government work unit, to plan and administer its own resources (Rakia, 2021). Its capacity to oversee the Otsus Fund thus depends, in a very practical sense, on how its Secretariat plans and secures the budget for oversight activities.

This dependency is the core problem addressed in this article. Budgets are not neutral technical documents; they are statements of political priority and the means by which policy is translated into action (Wildavsky, 1964). Where planning is weak, the gap between a policy's stated objectives and what is actually delivered can widen at every link in the implementation chain, a problem that Pressman and Wildavsky (1984) famously traced in their study of federal programmes. In Papua, previous studies have shown that accountability for Otsus spending depends on leadership commitment and reporting integrity (Agustinus, 2015), and that the budget knowledge of overseeing councils is a significant predictor of the quality of supervision (Kuddy, 2021). Little is known, however, about the administrative machinery that equips the MRP, rather than the legislature, to perform its oversight role, and even less about how this machinery operates in a province that has existed for barely three years.

Preliminary observation at the MRP Secretariat of South Papua indicated that budget planning involved not only the estimation of needs but also intensive negotiation among actors with different priorities, and that gaps frequently emerged between planned activity needs, available funds, and the technical rules of regional financial management. To examine these dynamics systematically, this study adopts the policy implementation model of Edwards (1980), which explains implementation success through four interacting variables: communication, resources, disposition, and bureaucratic structure. The model is well suited to the case because it directs attention to the internal conditions of the implementing organisation, which is precisely where the Secretariat's planning function sits.

The study addresses three questions: (1) how is budget-planning policy implemented at the MRP Secretariat of South Papua Province; (2) how does that

planning support the Assembly's oversight of the Otsus Fund; and (3) which factors support or inhibit implementation? Beyond describing the four Edwards III variables, the article advances an analytical argument that emerged from the data: the Secretariat's planning was procedurally compliant while the budget it produced eroded the very function it was meant to serve. Reading the budget as a record of revealed priority, rather than taking formal compliance at face value, offers a sharper diagnosis of implementation in special-autonomy institutions and contributes to the literature on public policy as purposive governmental choice (Anderson, 2015; Dye, 2017).

2. LITERATURE REVIEW

2.1 Public Policy and the Implementation Problem

Public policy, in Dye's (2017) well-known formulation, is whatever governments choose to do or not to do. Anderson (2015) narrows this to a purposive course of action followed by an actor or set of actors in dealing with a problem, while Dunn (2018) emphasises that policies are complex patterns of interdependent collective choices made by government agencies. All three definitions are relevant here. Budget planning at the MRP Secretariat is a governmental choice about the allocation of scarce resources; it is purposive, in that it is meant to enable the MRP's mandate; and it is interdependent, because the Secretariat's choices are embedded in the planning and approval decisions of the provincial executive, the planning agency, and national ministries.

Implementation research emerged from the recognition that adopted policies frequently fail to produce their intended outcomes. Pressman and Wildavsky (1984) demonstrated how the multiplication of decision points erodes the probability of success. Subsequent work split into top-down models, which evaluate implementation against the intentions of central decision-makers, and bottom-up models, which emphasise the discretion and coping strategies of front-line implementers (Lipsky, 2010; Sabatier, 1986). Van Meter and Van Horn (1975) proposed one of the earliest integrated frameworks, linking policy standards, resources, inter-organisational communication, the characteristics of implementing agencies, the wider environment, and the disposition of implementers. Grindle (1980) added that, in developing countries, the content of policy and the context of implementation, including the power and interests of the actors involved, jointly determine outcomes.

Later syntheses sought to explain when particular models apply. Matland (1995) argued that implementation varies with the degree of policy ambiguity and conflict: low-conflict but highly ambiguous policies tend to produce experimental implementation in which local conditions and available resources determine what is actually done. O'Toole (2000) and Hill and Hupe (2014) noted that the field has

moved from searching for a single grand theory towards a more contextual understanding of multi-level and multi-actor governance. These insights are important for the present case, in which a cultural representative body depends on an executive bureaucracy for its resources.

2.2 Edwards III's Model of Policy Implementation

Edwards (1980) identified four critical variables that operate simultaneously and interact with one another. The first is communication: implementation succeeds only when those responsible know what they are supposed to do, which requires the accurate *transmission* of decisions, the *clarity* of instructions, and the *consistency* of messages across sources. The second is resources, encompassing adequate numbers of competent staff, relevant information, the authority to act, and facilities. Without sufficient resources, Edwards argued, even clearly communicated policies remain paper commitments.

The third variable is disposition, the attitudes and commitment of implementers. Implementers may possess the knowledge and resources to act and still fail to do so if they disagree with the policy or have competing priorities; disposition is therefore linked to staffing decisions and incentives. The fourth is bureaucratic structure, which Edwards decomposed into *standard operating procedures* (SOPs), the routines that allow organisations to handle large volumes of work uniformly, and *fragmentation*, the dispersion of responsibility for a policy area among multiple units. Rigid SOPs may obstruct adaptation, while fragmentation diffuses responsibility and complicates coordination. Because the four variables interact, a weakness in one tends to undermine the others, which is why the model is frequently used to diagnose implementation failure in public organisations.

2.3 Budget Planning as Policy Implementation

Public budgeting has been characterised since Wildavsky (1964) as an essentially political process in which agencies negotiate their share of resources within a set of established expectations. Davis *et al.*, (1966) formalised this insight, showing that budget outcomes in a given year can be predicted largely from the previous year's base plus a relatively stable increment. Lindblom's (1959) account of incremental "muddling through" offered the decision-theoretic rationale: under conditions of limited information and contested values, decision-makers rely on marginal adjustments rather than comprehensive re-evaluation. Incrementalism protects the base, but it also means that items outside the base, such as new programmes or functions without established constituencies, are the most vulnerable when resources contract.

Reform movements in the public sector have sought to shift budgeting from inputs to results. Performance-oriented budgeting promises to link allocations to measurable outputs and outcomes, yet

empirical assessments show that organisations frequently adopt the formal apparatus of performance management without using performance information in decisions (Moynihan, 2006). Accountability, defined by Bovens (2007) as a relationship in which an actor is obliged to explain and justify conduct to a forum that can pose questions and pass judgement, depends on such information being available. In the Indonesian regional setting, budget planning follows a nested sequence of documents, from medium-term development plans and strategic plans to annual work plans, budget policy and ceilings, work-and-budget plans (RKA), and finally the Budget Implementation Document (DPA). Each document is both a technical instrument and a point at which priorities are negotiated.

2.4 Special Autonomy, the MRP, and Oversight

The implementation of special autonomy in Papua has been widely criticised. Bertrand (2014) argued that inconsistent implementation by Jakarta, the delayed establishment of the MRP, and the administrative division of the region undermined the stabilising potential of autonomy. Legal analyses emphasise that the MRP holds only specific powers to protect the rights of Indigenous Papuans and gives consideration and approval to special regional regulations without full legislative authority (Rakia, 2021). Bonso and Lawelai (2020), assessing the MRP's role in making special regional regulations in Papua Province, found its commitment and role to be relatively high but its actual involvement only moderate, suggesting a gap between formal mandate and substantive participation.

On the fiscal side, Purwadi (2018) found that most Otsus-funded activities in Jayapura City between 2008 and 2014 complied with the applicable guidelines and involved Indigenous Papuans, while Agustinus (2015) concluded that accountable management of the fund requires strong commitment from the governor and agency staff and honest, results-oriented reporting. Kuddy (2021) showed that the budget knowledge of members of the Papuan legislature significantly improves supervision of the Otsus Fund, with community participation strengthening the effect. More broadly, Lewis (2005) documented how Indonesian local governments accumulated substantial unspent balances after decentralisation, a pattern that echoes the recurring problem of budget surpluses (SILPA) in Papuan institutions.

2.5 Summary of Prior Studies

Table 1 summarises the prior studies most relevant to this research and indicates the gap that the present study addresses. Existing work has examined the legal standing of the MRP, the accountability of Otsus spending by provincial and municipal governments, and the role of legislative knowledge in supervision. None has examined the planning machinery of an MRP Secretariat, and none has applied Edwards III's

framework to the budget of a cultural representative body in a newly created province.

Table 1: Summary of Prior Studies

Author (year)	Focus and setting	Method	Key findings	Gap addressed by this study
Bertrand (2014)	Implementation of special autonomy and regional stability in Papua	Qualitative political analysis	Inconsistent central implementation, the delayed MRP, and administrative division undermined autonomy's stabilising potential	Macro-political; does not examine the administrative and budgetary support of the MRP
Agustinus (2015)	Accountability in implementing and reporting Otsus spending, Papua Province	Qualitative, phenomenological	Accountability requires leadership commitment, lawful use of resources, and honest, results-oriented reporting	Focuses on executive spending agencies, not on the overseeing body's own budget
Purwadi (2018)	Compliance of Otsus-funded activities with rules, Jayapura City	Quantitative descriptive, concentration and crosstab analysis	Most activities complied with guidelines, involved Indigenous Papuans, and supported the mayor's vision	Measures compliance; does not ask whether compliance sustains oversight capacity
Bonso & Lawelai (2020)	Effectiveness of the MRP in making special regional regulations, Papua Province	Mixed methods, interviews and questionnaires	MRP commitment and role rated high, but actual involvement only moderate	Legislative role of the MRP; budget planning of its Secretariat not examined
Rakia (2021)	Special authority of the MRP in forming special regional regulations	Normative juridical, statute approach	The MRP has specific protective powers but no full legislative authority	Legal mandate only; no empirical analysis of implementation
Kuddy (2021)	Budget knowledge of council members and supervision of the Otsus Fund, Jayapura	Quantitative survey, 111 respondents, regression	Budget knowledge improves supervision; community participation moderates the effect	Studies the legislature (DPRP), not the MRP, and uses no implementation framework
Lewis (2005)	Local government spending, taxing, and saving before and after decentralisation, Indonesia	Quantitative fiscal analysis	Post-decentralisation local governments accumulated large unspent balances	National pattern; not applied to special-autonomy institutions in a new province

Source: Compiled by the authors from the cited studies (2026).

2.6 Conceptual Framework

Building on the literature, this study treats budget planning at the MRP Secretariat as a policy whose implementation is conditioned by Edwards III's four variables. Communication concerns how planning policies, ceilings, and priorities are transmitted, how clearly they are understood, and how consistently they are applied by the Secretariat, the MRP leadership, and the provincial planning apparatus. Resources include staff numbers and competence, financial allocations, facilities, information systems, and data. Disposition

captures the commitment, responsibility, and willingness of implementers, including the timeliness and accuracy of planning. Bureaucratic structure covers the organisational chart, the division of tasks, SOPs, and coordination mechanisms. The joint operation of these variables is expected to shape the effectiveness of budget planning, operationalised as alignment between the budget and the MRP's work programme, rationality of allocation, accountability, and the capacity of the budget to support oversight of the Otsus Fund. Table 2 presents the framework and its operationalisation.

Table 2: Conceptual Framework and Operationalisation of Edwards III's Variables

Dimension	Indicators	Analytical codes	Main data sources
Communication	Transmission of planning information; clarity of programme and ceiling information; consistency across levels; inter-unit coordination	KOM1–KOM3	Interviews, meeting records, planning documents
Resources	Staff numbers and competence; financial allocation; facilities and premises; information and supporting data	SD1–SD4	Interviews, DPA 2025–2026, observation
Disposition	Commitment of officials; responsibility of implementers; willingness and timeliness in executing planning policy	DIS1–DIS3	In-depth interviews, budget realisation

Bureaucratic structure	Organisational structure; division of tasks and authority; SOPs; coordination mechanisms	SB1–SB4	Interviews, organisational regulation, observation
Outcome: effectiveness of budget planning	Alignment with the work programme; rationality of allocation; accountability; support for Otsus oversight	PA1–PA4	DPA 2025–2026, interviews

Source: Developed by the authors from Edwards (1980) and the thesis operationalisation (2026).

3. RESEARCH METHODS

This study employed a qualitative approach with a descriptive case study design. A qualitative design was chosen because the objective was not to test hypotheses but to understand, in its natural setting, how a policy is enacted by the people responsible for it and how they interpret the conditions they face (Creswell & Poth, 2018). The case study strategy is appropriate for investigating a contemporary phenomenon within its real-life context when the boundary between phenomenon and context is not clearly evident (Yin, 2018). The case is the Secretariat of the MRP of South Papua Province, located in Merauke, the provincial capital. The scope covers the Secretariat's budget-planning policy, the formulation of programmes and activities financed through its budget, the contribution of

planning to oversight of the Otsus Fund, and the factors that affect implementation, for fiscal years 2025 and 2026.

Informants were selected purposively on the basis of their direct involvement in, and knowledge of, budget planning and the MRP's oversight function. Five informants participated, as presented in Table 3. The number was determined by the principle of data saturation, that is, collection continued until additional interviews yielded no substantively new information relevant to the research questions. Although small, a purposive sample of key office-holders can reach thematic saturation quickly in a homogeneous organisational setting (Guest *et al.*, 2006); its limitations are acknowledged in the conclusion.

Table 3: Research Informants

Code	Position	Number	Role in the study
I-1	Secretary of the MRP, South Papua Province	1	Key informant
I-2	Planning and Finance Division	1	Main informant
I-3	Commitment-Making Official (PPK)	1	Main informant
I-4	Treasurer	1	Supporting informant
I-5	Chair of the MRP	1	Main informant
	Total	5	

Source: Thesis fieldwork data, processed by the authors (2026).

Primary data were obtained through in-depth semi-structured interviews, direct observation of planning activities and coordination mechanisms at the Secretariat, and field notes. Secondary data comprised the Secretariat's DPA for fiscal years 2025 and 2026, budget realisation reports, the laws and regulations governing special autonomy and the MRP, and relevant scholarly literature. Data were analysed using the interactive model of Miles *et al.*, (2014), consisting of data condensation, data display, and conclusion drawing and verification. Coding was directed by the Edwards III framework: each segment of interview, observation, and document data was assigned to one or more of the analytical codes listed in Table 2, after which cross-variable analysis examined how the four dimensions interacted. Budget documents were analysed by computing the composition of spending and its change between the two fiscal years.

Trustworthiness was established through the criteria of credibility, transferability, dependability, and confirmability (Lincoln & Guba, 1985). Credibility was strengthened by triangulating sources (Secretariat officials, financial staff, and MRP leadership), methods (interviews, observation, and DPA analysis), and theory

(confronting empirical findings with Edwards III's propositions). Thick description of the setting supports transferability, and an audit trail linking interview excerpts, codes, and budget figures supports dependability and confirmability. Interview excerpts are reported in English translation and attributed by informant code.

4. RESULTS

4.1 Institutional and Regulatory Setting

Informants described the MRP's institutional history in three phases. The first, from 2001 to 2004, established the legal basis: Law No. 21 of 2001 (2001) created the MRP as a cultural representative institution, while implementing regulations governed its formation and the block-grant funding on which it would later depend. During this phase, special autonomy was exercised mainly by the provincial government and the Papuan legislature, with the MRP still at the planning stage. The second phase, from 2004 to 2008, saw the formal establishment of the MRP under Government Regulation No. 54 of 2004 (2004), subsequently amended by Government Regulation No. 64 of 2008 (2008). As I-1 explained:

"Government Regulation 54 of 2004 is the birth of the MRP; it became the basic regulation for forming the MRP secretariat." (I-1)

The third phase began with Law No. 2 of 2021 (2021), which strengthened the governance of the Otsus Fund and its supervision, and continued with the establishment of South Papua Province under Law No. 14 of 2022 (2022). The MRP of South Papua was inaugurated on 6 November 2023, and the organisation and working procedures of its Secretariat are governed by a governor regulation issued in 2022. Informants consistently stressed the hierarchical nature of the regulatory framework, running from the autonomy laws through Ministry of Home Affairs regulations on planning and budget classification down to provincial governor regulations, with the Otsus Fund as the focal point.

A crucial clarification concerned the limits of the MRP's budgetary role. I-2 contrasted the MRP with the provincial legislature:

"The budget committee of the DPR discusses and has authority over all regional agencies, whereas the MRP, through its Budget Subdivision, only manages the MRP's internal budget, not the regional budget as a whole. The MRP only oversees the regional budget." (I-2)

The planning chain itself follows the national framework. According to I-3, the Secretariat's budget is derived from the national and provincial medium-term development plans, translated into a strategic plan, entered into the regional government work plan, and then formulated as a combined work plan and RKA. After the governor issues the general budget policy and provisional ceilings, and following plenary approval, allocations are distributed to agencies and entered into the regional government information system (SIPD), evaluated by the regional planning agency, and finally issued as the DPA. I-3 noted that annual programmes are typically built on the previous year's figures with a proportional increase, for example from ten billion to eleven billion rupiah, a practice that is incremental in the classic sense.

4.2 Budget Planning for Fiscal Year 2025

The 2025 DPA allocated a total of Rp17,550,985,548 across two programmes: the general programme supporting regional government affairs, consisting of seventeen sub-activities, and a dedicated Programme Supporting the Duties and Authority of the MRP, consisting of three sub-activities directly linked to the Assembly's mandate. Table 4 presents the allocation.

Table 4: Programmes and Sub-activities of the MRP Secretariat, Fiscal Year 2025

No.	Programme / sub-activity	Budget (Rp)
A. Programme Supporting Regional Government Affairs		
1	Preparation of regional agency planning documents	92,562,500
2	Salaries and allowances of civil servants	6,835,611,548
3	Administrative support for civil-servant duties	1,387,920,000
4	Electrical installation and lighting components for office buildings	40,890,000
5	Office logistics supplies	255,000,000
6	Printing and duplication	136,113,500
7	Facilitation of guest visits	103,096,800
8	Coordination and consultation meetings	860,910,000
9	Procurement of other equipment and machinery	70,049,200
10	Procurement of office buildings or other structures	450,000,000
11	Correspondence services	27,500,000
12	Communication, water, and electricity services	90,000,000
13	General office services	249,233,000
14	Maintenance and tax of official vehicles	20,250,000
15	Preparation of leadership materials	360,000,000
16	Facilitation of leadership communication	315,000,000
17	Management of leadership documentation	115,000,000
B. Programme Supporting the Duties and Authority of the MRP		
18	Provision of advice, consideration, and approval	2,102,000,000
19	Channelling aspirations and complaints of customary communities, religious communities, women, and the general public	2,074,210,000
20	Facilitation and resolution of problems arising from public aspirations and complaints	1,964,639,000
	Total budget	17,550,985,548

Source: DPA of the MRP Secretariat of South Papua Province, Fiscal Year 2025. Note: the itemised figures sum to Rp1,000,000 less than the stated total; the total is reported as stated in the DPA.

Four features of the 2025 allocation stand out. First, salaries and allowances absorbed Rp6.84 billion, or 38.95% of the total, indicating an input-oriented budget in which the cost of the apparatus is the single largest item. Second, the three sub-activities that operationalise the MRP's core functions together received Rp6.14 billion, or 34.99% of the budget, a share comparable to personnel spending. Third, coordination and consultation meetings and the facilitation of leadership communication together received Rp1.18 billion (6.70%), signalling significant investment in the communication infrastructure that Edwards III considers

a precondition of implementation. Fourth, Rp520 million (2.96%) was allocated to office construction and equipment, reflecting the capacity-building needs of an institution in a newly established province.

4.3 Budget Planning for Fiscal Year 2026 and Comparison

The 2026 DPA presents a markedly different picture. The total fell to Rp9,130,319,508 and the document lists thirteen sub-activities, all within the general support programme (Table 5).

Table 5: Sub-activities of the MRP Secretariat, Fiscal Year 2026

No.	Sub-activity	Budget (Rp)
1	Preparation of regional agency documents	91,847,500
2	Salaries and allowances of civil servants	4,431,320,008
3	Administrative support for civil-servant duties	1,057,920,000
4	Electrical installation and lighting components for office buildings	149,550,000
5	Office logistics supplies	950,000,000
6	Printing and duplication	168,805,000
7	Facilitation of guest visits	579,600,000
8	Coordination and consultation meetings	767,634,000
9	Procurement of other equipment and machinery	70,900,000
10	Correspondence services	27,500,000
11	Communication, water, and electricity services	180,000,000
12	General office services	632,493,000
13	Maintenance and tax of official vehicles	23,750,000
	Total budget	9,130,319,508

Source: DPA of the MRP Secretariat of South Papua Province, Fiscal Year 2026. Note: the itemised figures sum to Rp1,000,000 more than the stated total; the total is reported as stated in the DPA.

Table 6 compares the structure of the two budgets. The total declined by 47.98%. Personnel spending fell in absolute terms but rose from 38.95% to 48.53% of the budget, because cuts fell disproportionately elsewhere. Most strikingly, the Programme Supporting the Duties and Authority of the MRP, worth Rp6.14 billion in 2025, does not appear in

the 2026 DPA at all, nor do the three leadership-support sub-activities. At the same time, office logistics rose by 272.5% (from Rp255 million to Rp950 million) and the facilitation of guest visits by 462.2% (from Rp103.1 million to Rp579.6 million). Logistics, guest facilitation, and general office services together grew from 3.46% to 23.68% of the budget.

Table 6: Comparison of Budget Composition, Fiscal Years 2025 and 2026

Budget component	2025 (Rp)	Share 2025	2026 (Rp)	Share 2026
Total budget (as stated in DPA)	17,550,985,548	100.00%	9,130,319,508	100.00%
Salaries and allowances	6,835,611,548	38.95%	4,431,320,008	48.53%
Core MRP programme (items 18–20)	6,140,849,000	34.99%	–	0.00%
Coordination and leadership communication	1,175,910,000	6.70%	767,634,000	8.41%
Logistics, guest visits, and general office services	607,329,800	3.46%	2,162,093,000	23.68%
Leadership materials and documentation	475,000,000	2.71%	–	0.00%
Buildings, equipment, and machinery	520,049,200	2.96%	70,900,000	0.78%
Administrative support for civil servants	1,387,920,000	7.91%	1,057,920,000	11.59%

Source: Calculated by the authors from the DPA of the MRP Secretariat of South Papua Province, Fiscal Years 2025 and 2026. Shares are computed against the totals stated in each DPA.

The disappearance of the core programme admits more than one interpretation. Some of its activities may have been absorbed into general items such as coordination meetings, or financed through channels outside the Secretariat's DPA. Even under the most charitable reading, however, the absence of a

dedicated, measurable line means that the MRP's advisory, aspiration-channelling, and problem-resolution functions, through which its oversight of special autonomy is exercised, no longer have a visible budgetary anchor.

4.4 Communication

Communication in the planning process ran through formal mechanisms: coordination meetings, internal consultations, development planning forums, and a budget drafting team that worked according to the Ministry of Home Affairs classification of programmes. Informants regarded this coordination as the backbone of the process:

"Coordination of the activities in the budget drafting team, according to the activities listed in the Home Affairs classification, that is the key." (I-3)

Participation was formally broad. According to I-2, all echelon II officials took part, considering needs and regulations, with input from MRP members responsible for finance. Transmission therefore existed and was funded. Clarity and consistency were weaker. Informants reported that operational staff did not always grasp how planning decisions related to the oversight of the Otsus Fund, and that differing regulatory signals, including disharmony among special regional regulations governing the MRP's duties, produced divergent readings of priorities. Differences in perception between the MRP leadership and Secretariat officials concerned, in particular, the balance between internal operational needs and external oversight functions. Communication with external systems was a further constraint: needs articulated within the Secretariat could not always be expressed in the format the planning system required.

4.5 Resources

Formally, staffing was adequate: the echelon IV positions in the Secretariat had been filled. Substantively, informants described a shortage of staff with competence in planning, budgeting, monitoring, and evaluation, which forced several employees to hold dual roles. Physical resources were a recurrent concern:

"The MRP building is still a rented building, so it is not adequate to support all operational activities." (I-4)

The most consequential resource constraint, however, concerned the fit between the Secretariat's needs and the technical instruments of regional finance. I-4 summarised the problem:

"The constraints are the gap between needs and the many wants, and the availability of money; some items cannot be accommodated in the standard unit prices, and the SIPD system does not accommodate them." (I-4)

The regional standard unit price list (SSH) and SIPD are designed for routine administrative spending. Activities specific to a cultural representative body, such as consultations with customary communities in remote districts, do not map easily onto these categories, so that some necessary items could not be entered into the plan at all. Observation further revealed that information

resources were thin: MRP members presented documents in deliberations without supporting data, and no indicators were in place to measure the MRP's performance. The financial resource base itself contracted sharply between 2025 and 2026, as shown in Table 6.

4.6 Disposition

Informants expressed commitment to carrying out programmes in accordance with the rules, and this commitment was visible in the regular preparation of planning documents, the management of spending according to the DPA, and administrative support to the Assembly. The 2025 allocations to the core MRP sub-activities can be read as a tangible expression of that commitment. Disposition was nonetheless tested by timing. I-4 acknowledged that approval delays repeatedly produced unspent balances:

"It was only approved at the end of 2024, so there was a large SILPA [budget surplus]. The same happened in 2015." (I-4)

I-4 also conceded that not all activities were planned with adequate attention to implementation timelines. Informants generally described their stance towards regulatory change as reactive rather than anticipatory: adjustments were made when new rules arrived rather than built into the planning cycle. Read alongside the 2026 allocation, the data suggest a gap between the commitment officials stated and the priorities that the budget actually expressed.

4.7 Bureaucratic Structure

The Secretariat's structure was clearly defined by regulation. The Secretary coordinates divisions responsible for planning and finance and for general affairs and personnel; the Budget Subdivision manages the budget and its realisation and reports quarterly, semi-annually, and annually; and technical activity officials (PPTK) ensure that spending complies with the DPA. As I-4 put it:

"The Budget Subdivision in the MRP handles the budget and realisation, including reporting realisation quarterly, by semester, and annually; that is its core task." (I-4)

Formal SOPs for budget preparation existed and followed regional planning regulations, but they were procedural rather than outcome-oriented: they did not include mechanisms to verify that planned spending advanced oversight objectives. In practice, task boundaries blurred as staff multitasked, and coordination between units in aligning programme proposals remained a challenge. A deeper structural limit lay outside the Secretariat. I-2 observed that "the manager of Otsus is the Ministry of Finance, not the region" (I-2), which in informants' view limited the MRP's leverage over the fund it was expected to oversee and deprived it of a strong data basis for its deliberations.

4.8 Supporting and Inhibiting Factors

Table 7 summarises the factors that informants and documents identified as supporting or inhibiting the

implementation of budget-planning policy, mapped onto the Edwards III dimensions.

Table 7: Supporting and Inhibiting Factors in Implementing Budget-Planning Policy

Edwards III dimension	Supporting factors	Inhibiting factors
Communication	Funded coordination and consultation meetings; budget drafting team; participation of echelon II officials and MRP finance members	Limited clarity at operational level; inconsistent regulatory signals and disharmony among special regional regulations; differing perceptions of priorities
Resources	Regulatory basis for funding; DPA allocations in 2025 and 2026; filled echelon IV positions	Shortage of planning and M&E competence; dual roles; rented premises; SSH and SIPD unable to accommodate MRP-specific items; thin data; 48% budget contraction
Disposition	Stated commitment of leadership and staff; regular preparation of planning documents	Late approvals and recurrent SILPA; reactive response to regulatory change; gap between stated and enacted priorities
Bureaucratic structure	Clear organisational regulation; Budget Subdivision with periodic reporting; PPTK supervision against the DPA	Procedural rather than outcome-oriented SOPs; blurred task boundaries; no MRP performance indicators; Otsus Fund managed nationally
Context	Legal framework of special autonomy (Law No. 21 of 2001, 2001; Law No. 2 of 2021, 2021; Government Regulation No. 54 of 2004, 2004; Government Regulation No. 64 of 2008, 2008)	Frequent regulatory change; vast territory with remote districts; capacity-building phase of a new province

Source: Interviews, observation, and DPA analysis, processed by the authors (2026).

5. DISCUSSION

Read dimension by dimension, the findings resemble those of many Edwards III studies: communication exists but is imperfect, resources are scarce, commitment is present but uneven, and structures are formally clear but practically fragmented. Such a reading, however, misses the most important pattern in the data. Across all four dimensions, the Secretariat performed well on procedural criteria and poorly on substantive ones. Planning documents were prepared on schedule and according to the prescribed hierarchy; coordination forums met and were funded; reporting obligations were fulfilled; the organisational chart was clear. Yet the budget that emerged from this compliant process removed the dedicated financing of the very functions through which the MRP oversees special autonomy. The central tension of the case is therefore not a deficit of rules or procedures but a decoupling between procedural compliance and oversight capacity.

5.1 The Budget as Revealed Priority

Institutional theory offers a precise vocabulary for this pattern. Meyer and Rowan (1977) argued that organisations operating in highly institutionalised environments adopt formal structures that signal conformity with prevailing rules, and protect those structures from scrutiny by decoupling them from actual technical activity. The MRP Secretariat displays exactly this configuration. Its formal structure mirrors the requirements of regional financial regulation, reflecting the coercive and mimetic pressures that DiMaggio and

Powell (1983) identified as drivers of organisational isomorphism, while its substantive output, the composition of the 2026 budget, moved away from the oversight mandate. Pritchett *et al.*, (2013) describe this phenomenon in developing states as isomorphic mimicry: organisations come to look like capable states by adopting the forms of functional institutions without acquiring their capability. Andrews (2013) adds that reforms often change what governments look like rather than what they can do, producing "gaps" between laws and practice that persist precisely because the formal requirements are met.

This lens refines Edwards III's model in a specific way. Edwards (1980) treats disposition as an attitudinal property of implementers, inferred largely from what they say and how they behave. The present data show that stated commitment and enacted priority can diverge sharply: officials expressed commitment to the MRP's mandate, yet the 2026 budget allocated nothing explicitly to it while expanding logistics and guest facilitation more than fivefold in combined share. For organisations whose main implementation instrument is the budget, disposition is better read through allocations than through declarations. We suggest the notion of budgetary disposition, the commitment revealed by the relative protection a function receives when resources contract, as a practical extension of Edwards's variable for public-finance contexts. Table 8 summarises how this procedural-substantive gap appears in each dimension.

Table 8: Synthesis Matrix: Procedural Compliance versus Substantive Oversight Capacity

Dimension	Procedural evidence (formal compliance)	Substantive evidence (oversight capacity)	Interpretation
Communication	Funded coordination meetings; budget drafting team; wide formal participation	Operational staff unclear on link to Otsus oversight; inconsistent signals on priorities	Transmission without shared purpose
Resources	Positions filled; DPA issued each year; system-based planning (SIPD)	Core programme removed; MRP-specific items not codable in SSH/SIPD; no performance data	Resources shaped by the system's categories rather than the mandate
Disposition	Stated commitment; documents prepared; spending follows DPA	Late approvals and SILPA; protocol and logistics expanded as core lines disappeared	Stated commitment diverges from budgetary disposition
Bureaucratic structure	Clear regulation of organisation; periodic reporting; PPTK supervision	SOPs measure process, not results; oversight function lacks an owning budget line	Structure ensures accountability for spending, not for oversight

Source: Authors' synthesis of interview, observation, and DPA data (2026).

5.2 Why Oversight Lines Are the First to Go

Why should the oversight function, rather than routine items, absorb the contraction? Budgeting theory provides a first answer. Incremental budgeting protects the base and adjusts at the margin (Davis *et al.*, 1966; Lindblom, 1959; Wildavsky, 1964). I-3's description of planning as last year's figure plus a percentage confirms that the Secretariat budgets incrementally. In such a system, salaries, office services, and logistics form a defended base, whereas programme lines such as aspiration channelling and problem resolution are discretionary and lack a bureaucratic constituency. When the envelope shrank by nearly half, the discretionary lines were cut first. The rise in personnel's share to 48.53% is the arithmetic consequence of this logic.

A second answer is structural and concerns accountability relationships. In Bovens's (2007) terms, accountability requires a forum able to question and sanction an actor. The MRP is intended to be such a forum vis-à-vis the provincial government's use of the Otsus Fund. Yet its own budget is drafted by a Secretariat that is part of the provincial bureaucracy, coded through the province's planning system, priced according to its standard unit prices, ceilinged by the governor's budget policy, and approved on the province's timetable. The overseer's purse, in other words, is held by the overseen. This paradox helps explain why informants located the most binding constraints outside the Secretariat: in the SSH and SIPD, in delayed approvals, and in national management of the Otsus Fund. It also resonates with Rakia's (2021) conclusion that the MRP's authority is limited by its weak legal backing, and with Bertrand's (2014) account of autonomy institutions weakened in implementation rather than in law.

Matland's (1995) ambiguity-conflict model sharpens the point. The MRP's oversight mandate is highly ambiguous: neither the laws nor the planning classification specify what oversight activities should cost, how they should be measured, or which unit owns them. Overt conflict, by contrast, is low; no informant

opposed the MRP's role. Under high ambiguity and low conflict, Matland predicts experimental implementation, in which outcomes depend on local resources and the actors who happen to be engaged. In the Secretariat, the actor most consistently engaged was the regional financial system itself, whose categories are clear and whose defaults favour routine administration. Ambiguity in the mandate was thus resolved by the clarity of the system.

5.3 Dialogue with Prior Studies

The findings both confirm and qualify prior research. They echo Bonso and Lawelai's (2020) observation that the MRP's commitment and role are rated higher than its actual involvement: in both cases formal standing outruns substantive participation. They also qualify Purwadi's (2018) evidence of high compliance in Otsus-funded activities in Jayapura. The South Papua case shows that compliance with rules and guidelines is compatible with the erosion of the functions those rules are meant to serve, so that compliance should not be treated as a proxy for effectiveness. Agustinus (2015) emphasised that accountable management requires leadership commitment and results-oriented reporting; our data suggest that results-oriented reporting cannot occur where no performance indicators exist, as was observed for the MRP. Kuddy (2021) found that the budget knowledge of overseeing councils improves supervision; the observation that MRP members presented documents without supporting data indicates that the information side of oversight capacity is a parallel weakness to the financial side.

The recurrent SILPA linked to late approvals mirrors Lewis's (2005) finding that Indonesian local governments accumulated large unspent balances after decentralisation. In the present case, surpluses do not signal abundance but the misalignment of approval and implementation calendars, which can paradoxically justify subsequent cuts. Finally, the capacity-building expenditures of 2025, including office construction while the Assembly still rented premises, and the

contraction of 2026 are consistent with the warning of Fitrani *et al.*, (2005) that new administrative units are created faster than their institutions can be consolidated. Similar patterns of adopting performance apparatus without using performance information have been documented in far better-resourced settings (Moynihan, 2006), which suggests that the South Papua case is an acute instance of a general problem rather than an anomaly.

5.4 Theoretical and Practical Implications

Theoretically, the study shows that Edwards III's variables remain a useful diagnostic scaffold, consistent with the view of O'Toole (2000) and Hill and Hupe (2014) that implementation frameworks must be adapted to their institutional context. Its contribution is to show that, in budget-dependent oversight bodies, the four variables should be evaluated against the substantive content of the budget rather than against procedural conformity alone. Combining Edwards III with institutional theory explains why an organisation can score well on formal indicators of each variable while failing its core purpose. This also connects the micro-level of implementers, emphasised by bottom-up scholars such as Lipsky (2010), with the macro-level architecture of fiscal decentralisation discussed by Oates (1999).

Practically, the analysis points to remedies that go beyond exhortations to improve communication or commitment. If the problem is that oversight lacks an owned, measurable budget line inside a system that defaults to routine administration, then the solution is to create one: a ring-fenced oversight programme in the DPA, with codified activities in the planning classification, SSH entries for MRP-specific activities such as community consultations in remote districts, and a small set of performance indicators reported alongside financial realisation. Andrews *et al.*, (2013) caution that such fixes succeed when they are developed iteratively around locally defined problems rather than imported as best-practice templates; the Secretariat, the MRP leadership, the regional planning agency, and the Ministry of Home Affairs would need to define these indicators jointly and test them over successive budget cycles.

6. CONCLUSION

This study examined the implementation of budget-planning policy at the Secretariat of the MRP of South Papua Province through Edwards III's model. With respect to the first research question, implementation was procedurally sound: planning followed the prescribed regulatory hierarchy, coordination was formally inclusive and funded, and organisational responsibilities were clearly defined. Communication nonetheless lacked clarity and consistency at the operational level, resources were constrained by staff shortages, rented premises, and planning systems that could not accommodate MRP-

specific needs, disposition was weakened by late approvals and reactive adjustment, and structures ensured accountability for spending rather than for results.

With respect to the second question, budget planning supported Otsus oversight in 2025 through a dedicated programme worth Rp6.14 billion, but this support disappeared from the 2026 DPA as the total budget fell by about 48%, personnel's share rose to 48.53%, and logistics, guest facilitation, and office services expanded. With respect to the third question, supporting factors included the legal framework of special autonomy, available allocations, stated commitment, and formal coordination, whereas inhibiting factors included limited competence and dual roles, inadequate facilities, rigid SSH and SIPD categories, approval delays and SILPA, the absence of performance indicators, national management of the Otsus Fund, regulatory change, and difficult geography.

The central conclusion is that the Secretariat exhibits a decoupling between procedural compliance and oversight capacity. Because the overseer's budget is produced within the planning system of the executive it oversees and is governed by incremental routines, the least-protected function, oversight itself, bore the brunt of contraction. We therefore recommend (1) a ring-fenced programme for the MRP's mandated functions in each DPA; (2) the codification of MRP-specific activities in the planning classification and the standard unit price list; (3) binding timelines for the approval of the MRP budget to prevent recurrent SILPA; (4) a compact set of MRP performance indicators and a data-support function that equips members with realisation and programme data; (5) targeted training in planning, budgeting, monitoring, and evaluation; and (6) structured coordination with the Ministry of Finance and the Ministry of Home Affairs on the oversight of the Otsus Fund.

The study has limitations. It relies on five informants within one Secretariat and on two fiscal years of budget documents, and it could not trace whether activities removed from the 2026 DPA were financed through other channels. Future research should compare MRP secretariats across the new Papuan provinces, follow budget lines over a longer period, and incorporate the perspectives of the provincial planning agency and of the Indigenous communities whose aspirations the MRP is meant to represent.

REFERENCES

- Agustinus, J. (2015). Accountability perspective: Implementation and reporting on spending fund of Papua special autonomy. *Information Management and Business Review*, 7(2), 79–86. <https://doi.org/10.22610/imbr.v7i2.1142>
- Anderson, J. E. (2015). *Public policymaking: An introduction* (8th ed.). Cengage Learning.

- Andrews, M. (2013). *The limits of institutional reform in development: Changing rules for realistic solutions*. Cambridge University Press.
- Andrews, M., Pritchett, L., & Woolcock, M. (2013). Escaping capability traps through problem driven iterative adaptation (PDIA). *World Development*, 51, 234–244. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.worlddev.2013.05.011>
- Bertrand, J. (2014). Autonomy and stability: The perils of implementation and "divide-and-rule" tactics in Papua, Indonesia. *Nationalism and Ethnic Politics*, 20(2), 174–199. <https://doi.org/10.1080/13537113.2014.909157>
- Bonso, H., & Lawelai, H. (2020). Efektivitas pembuatan peraturan daerah khusus di Provinsi Papua: Studi Majelis Rakyat Papua [The effectiveness of making special regional regulations in Papua Province: A study of the Papuan People's Assembly]. *Jurnal Studi Ilmu Pemerintahan*, 1(2), 30–45. <https://doi.org/10.35326/jsip.v1i2.737>
- Bovens, M. (2007). Analysing and assessing accountability: A conceptual framework. *European Law Journal*, 13(4), 447–468. <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0386.2007.00378.x>
- Creswell, J. W., & Poth, C. N. (2018). *Qualitative inquiry and research design: Choosing among five approaches* (4th ed.). SAGE Publications.
- Davis, O. A., Dempster, M. A. H., & Wildavsky, A. (1966). A theory of the budgetary process. *American Political Science Review*, 60(3), 529–547. <https://doi.org/10.2307/1952969>
- DiMaggio, P. J., & Powell, W. W. (1983). The iron cage revisited: Institutional isomorphism and collective rationality in organizational fields. *American Sociological Review*, 48(2), 147–160. <https://doi.org/10.2307/2095101>
- Dunn, W. N. (2018). *Public policy analysis: An integrated approach* (6th ed.). Routledge.
- Dye, T. R. (2017). *Understanding public policy* (15th ed.). Pearson.
- Edwards, G. C., III. (1980). *Implementing public policy*. Congressional Quarterly Press.
- Fitriani, F., Hofman, B., & Kaiser, K. (2005). Unity in diversity? The creation of new local governments in a decentralising Indonesia. *Bulletin of Indonesian Economic Studies*, 41(1), 57–79. <https://doi.org/10.1080/00074910500072690>
- Government Regulation No. 54 of 2004 on the Papuan People's Assembly. (2004). Republic of Indonesia. <https://peraturan.bpk.go.id/Details/66296/pp-no-54-tahun-2004>
- Government Regulation No. 64 of 2008 on the Amendment to Government Regulation No. 54 of 2004 on the Papuan People's Assembly. (2008). Republic of Indonesia. <https://peraturan.bpk.go.id/Details/4881/pp-no-64-tahun-2008>
- Grindle, M. S. (Ed.). (1980). *Politics and policy implementation in the Third World*. Princeton University Press.
- Guest, G., Bunce, A., & Johnson, L. (2006). How many interviews are enough? An experiment with data saturation and variability. *Field Methods*, 18(1), 59–82. <https://doi.org/10.1177/1525822X05279903>
- Hill, M., & Hupe, P. (2014). *Implementing public policy: An introduction to the study of operational governance* (3rd ed.). SAGE Publications.
- Kuddy, A. L. (2021). Accountability and community participation as moderates on the relationship between the council's knowledge of the budget and supervision of the management of the Papua special autonomy fund. *Journal of Social Science*, 2(6), 731–742. <https://doi.org/10.46799/jss.v2i6.246>
- Law No. 2 of 2021 on the Second Amendment to Law No. 21 of 2001 on Special Autonomy for the Province of Papua. (2021). Republic of Indonesia. <https://peraturan.bpk.go.id/Details/172403>
- Law No. 14 of 2022 on the Establishment of South Papua Province. (2022). Republic of Indonesia. <https://peraturan.bpk.go.id/Details/217796>
- Law No. 21 of 2001 on Special Autonomy for the Province of Papua. (2001). Republic of Indonesia. <https://peraturan.bpk.go.id/Details/44901>
- Lewis, B. D. (2005). Indonesian local government spending, taxing and saving: An explanation of pre- and post-decentralization fiscal outcomes. *Asian Economic Journal*, 19(3), 291–317. <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-8381.2005.00214.x>
- Lincoln, Y. S., & Guba, E. G. (1985). *Naturalistic inquiry*. SAGE Publications.
- Lindblom, C. E. (1959). The science of "muddling through." *Public Administration Review*, 19(2), 79–88. <https://doi.org/10.2307/973677>
- Lipsky, M. (2010). *Street-level bureaucracy: Dilemmas of the individual in public services* (30th anniversary expanded ed.). Russell Sage Foundation.
- Matland, R. E. (1995). Synthesizing the implementation literature: The ambiguity-conflict model of policy implementation. *Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory*, 5(2), 145–174. <https://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordjournals.jpart.a037242>
- Meyer, J. W., & Rowan, B. (1977). Institutionalized organizations: Formal structure as myth and ceremony. *American Journal of Sociology*, 83(2), 340–363. <https://doi.org/10.1086/226550>
- Miles, M. B., Huberman, A. M., & Saldaña, J. (2014). *Qualitative data analysis: A methods sourcebook* (3rd ed.). SAGE Publications.
- Moynihan, D. P. (2006). Managing for results in state government: Evaluating a decade of reform. *Public Administration Review*, 66(1), 77–89. <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-6210.2006.00557.x>

- Oates, W. E. (1999). An essay on fiscal federalism. *Journal of Economic Literature*, 37(3), 1120–1149. <https://doi.org/10.1257/jel.37.3.1120>
- O'Toole, L. J., Jr. (2000). Research on policy implementation: Assessment and prospects. *Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory*, 10(2), 263–288. <https://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordjournals.jpart.a024270>
- Pressman, J. L., & Wildavsky, A. (1984). *Implementation* (3rd ed.). University of California Press.
- Pritchett, L., Woolcock, M., & Andrews, M. (2013). Looking like a state: Techniques of persistent failure in state capability for implementation. *The Journal of Development Studies*, 49(1), 1–18. <https://doi.org/10.1080/00220388.2012.709614>
- Purwadi, M. A. (2018). Special autonomy Papua: Compliance against applicable rules/guidelines (case study in Jayapura City). *Papua Law Journal*, 2(1), 67–84. <https://doi.org/10.31957/plj.v2i1.598>
- Rakia, A. S. R. S. (2021). Kewenangan khusus Majelis Rakyat Papua terhadap pembentukan Perdasus [The special authority of the Papuan People's Assembly in forming special regional regulations]. *Justisi*, 7(1), 14–25. <https://doi.org/10.33506/js.v7i1.1168>
- Sabatier, P. A. (1986). Top-down and bottom-up approaches to implementation research: A critical analysis and suggested synthesis. *Journal of Public Policy*, 6(1), 21–48. <https://doi.org/10.1017/S0143814X00003846>
- Van Meter, D. S., & Van Horn, C. E. (1975). The policy implementation process: A conceptual framework. *Administration & Society*, 6(4), 445–488. <https://doi.org/10.1177/009539977500600404>
- Wildavsky, A. (1964). *The politics of the budgetary process*. Little, Brown.
- Yin, R. K. (2018). *Case study research and applications: Design and methods* (6th ed.). SAGE Publications.

Cite This Article: Ohoiwutun, M. D., Sadhana, K., & Widjajani, R. (2026). Funding the Watchdog, Starving the Watch: Budget Planning and the Edwards III Implementation Gap at the Papuan People's Assembly Secretariat, South Papua. *East African Scholars J Econ Bus Manag*, 9(10), 353-365. <https://doi.org/10.36349/easjebm.2026.v09i10.003>
